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Abstract 
We report an experiment using a  design that permits the direct  measurement of 
individual  decision  rules  in  voluntary  contribution  games.  We  estimate  the  dis- 
tribution  of  altruism  in  our  subjects  and  find  that  observed  "overcontribution"  is 
attributable  to a  combination of random variation in  behavior and  a  few altruistic 
players. We also employ Andreoni's partners/strangers design to measure reputation 
effects. The only difference observed is that the strangers treatment produces slightly 
more  random  variation  in  behavior.  Our  results  explain  some  anomalies  about 
contribution  rates, and support past findings that  reputation-building plays a  minor 
role in such experiments. 
Keywords:  Voluntary contributions; Public goods; Experiments; Reputation; Learn- 
ing;  Errors 
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i.  Introduction 
The most common public goods experiment examines the extent to which 
contributions  occur  when  individuals  have  a  dominant  strategy  not  to 
contribute.  This mechanism of public good provision is called the voluntary 
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contribution mechanism. In these experiments, a  subject who is a  member 
of a  small group, is endowed with an amount of a  good that may either be 
consumed  privately  or  contributed  to  the  public  good  of  the  group. 
Incentives are usually designed so that a  self-interested subject has a  strict 
dominant strategy to contribute nothing, but the efficient outcome for the 
group is for each subject to contribute all their input to the public good. 
A  common finding in these experiments is that subjects often contribute, 
thereby  violating their  dominant strategy.  In  addition,  contribution  rates 
have been found to be correlated with a number of treatment variables such 
as  experience  and  induced preferences for the  public  good.  However,  to 
date there is no coherent theory that can account for the variety of findings 
that have been reported. A  number of casual explanations for some of these 
findings  have  been  offered  in  the  literature,  some  suggesting  a  type  of 
altruism  that  contaminates the  experimentally induced incentives,  1 and/or 
that the  subjects  are  trying to establish a  reputation  in  order to  influence 
play later in the experiment. 
In  Palfrey and  Prisbrey (1992)  we  proposed  an  alternative explanation, 
namely that most of the observed anomalies could be accounted for simply 
as  background  noise,  and  that  the  appearance  of  altruistic  behavior  or 
strategic reputation-building is  iilusionary or,  at best,  of minor importance 
in explaining the data. As a result of the usual experimental designs in which 
errors  can  only  be  manifested  as  overcontribution,  the  importance  of 
systematic findings such as altruism and strategic play have been overstated.  2 
To a limited extent, recent experiments have been conducted that lend some 
credence  to  this  view  3  but  a  careful  study  that  is  designed  to  precisely 
measure the relative contribution of each of the various proposed explana- 
tions has not yet been carried out.  Unfortunately, the typical experimental 
designs do not permit precise measurement of the separate contribution of 
these diverse effects: altruism, reputation-building, and noise. In this paper 
we present the results of an experiment that was specifically designed to sort 
out these effects and accurately measure the separate contribution of each. 
A  basic  premise  of  our  study  is  that  individual  behavior  can  be  de- 
composed  statistically into  a  systematic component  and  a  residual  com- 
ponent. We call the systematic component a  decision  rule,  and the residual 
component noise, or error. In the context of a  linear voluntary contribution 
game  it  is  natural  to  limit  attention  to  very simple  decision  rules,  called 
cutoff decision rules,  in  which an  individual contributes if and  only if his 
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marginal rate of substitution between the private good and the public good 
is less than or equal to some critical value. This includes as a  special case 
perfectly self-interested behavior,  ~ where  the critical value  is  1.  However+ 
altruistic behavior or reputation-building behavior would be consistent with 
decision rules where the critical value is set higher than 1. "Spiteful  +  behavior 
(Saijo and Nakamura, 1993) corresponds to a critical value less than  1. The 
noise component of individual behavior is modelled as statistical deviation 
from a  cutpoint rule. One way to think of this is that the observed decision 
rule  of a  subject  has some random variation over time due  to extraneous 
factors  that  are  essentially  impossible  to  measure.  These  factors  would 
include computational errors, errors associated with learning by doing+  and 
so  forth.  With  this  interpretation  of  the  noise  component,  we  expect 
experience  to lead to a  decrease in noise.  5 We interpret such decreases in 
noise as evidence of learning. 
Past  experimental  designs  make  it  virtually  impossible  to  accurately 
identify the decision rule component from the  noise component.  In  ,*hose 
experiments+ there is little if any variation of the marginal rate of substitu- 
tion.  Typically+  everyone  has  the  same  marginal  rate  of  substitution 
throughout the experiment, and it is greater than 1. The focus of attention is 
on the  aggregate  frequency of violations of a  deterministic version of the 
self-interest  model  of  behavior.  In  the  context  of  our  non-deterministic 
two-component model of individual behavior+ contribution could be due to 
altruism  or  reputation-building,  or  it  could  be  due  to  noise.  In  those 
experiments+  noise  leads  to  systematic bias  in  the  data+  in  that  (at  least 
relative to the  self-interested model) only noise that  leads to contribution 
can possibly be observed. 
An accurate measurement of a subject's decision rule and the magnitude 
of  the  noise  component  is  possible  in  a  heterogeneous  and  changing 
environment+  i.e.  an  environment  where  a  subject  faces  a  number  of 
different marginal rates of substitution, and yet his information is otherwise 
the  +,,ame.  It  is  then  possible+  by  a  variety  of  methods  (Palfrey  and 
Rosenthal+  1991)+ to  estimate  the  subject+s  decision  rule.  As  well  as 
estimating the extent to which cut-point rules deviate from l, these methods 
also calibrate the noise component. The design reported here systematically 
varies each subject's marginal rate of substitution in order to estimate the 
distribution of decision rules and  the  distribution of the  error  rates.  This 
allows  us  to  measure  the  extent  to  which  altruism  or  reputation-building 
explains the commonly observed overcontribution and the extent to which 
+Reputational play could also involve more complicated decision +-ules where the cut-point 
changes over time or as a function of history+. 
Experience could also lead to adaptation of the decision rule. although we find little 
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these observations can be accounted for simply as noise. This also allows us 
to measure the extent to which players learn by experience. 
Once  the  noise component and the systematic component of individual 
choice behavior have  been separated,  the  next step  is  to  break  down the 
systematic component of decision rules and to  identify the relative impor- 
tance  of  altruistic  behavior  and  strategic  reputation-building  behavior. 
Following the approach of Andreoni (1988),  we do this by conducting half 
of the experimental contribution games as a  sequence of one-shot encoun- 
ters with changing group  membership (the  "strangers' treatment) and  half 
the contribution games as a  sequence of encounters where group member- 
ship remains fixed (the 'partners' treatment). 
The difference between the deci;ion rule in a  series of one-time encoun- 
ters and the decision rule in a similar number of encounters repeated within 
the  same  group  could  Le  attributed  exclusively  to  reputation-building. 
Accordingly, a  comparison between the decision rules measured under the 
two treatments is then made. If reputation-building is an important part of 
the explanation, we should observe decision rules with higher points in the 
partners treatment than in the strangers treatment.  In addition,  we should 
observe  significantly  more  decay  (declining  contribution  rates  over  the 
course  of  an  experiment)  in  the  partners  treatment.  The  ability  of  our 
method  to  measure  error  rates  means  that  we  are  able  to  draw  firm 
conclusions  about  whether  decay  in  previous  experiments  was  due  to 
learning or was evidence of reputation-building. 
The  rest  of the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  the 
relevant findings from past experiments. Section 3 describes our experimen- 
tal  environment.  Section  4  explains  the  details  of  the  design.  Section  5 
analyzes the data. We make concluding remarks in Section 6. 
2.  Previous research 
The  experimental  study  of  public  good  provision  by  the  voluntary 
contribution mechanism has a  history that is well detailed in Dawes (1980) 
and in  Ledyard (1993).  Almost all  past  research,  including the influential 
works of Marwell and Ames (1979,  1980,  1981),  Isaac aras' Walker (1988), 
Issac et al.  (1984),  and Andreoni (1988),  examine situatic~s in which each 
subject's  marginal  rate  of  substitution  is  fixed  for  all  periods  of  the 
experiment; usually all subjects are assigned identical valuations. 
A  number of general findings have emerged from the literature: 
•  aggregate contribution rates range between 20%  and 50%; 
•  at  some  point  in  time  and  in  violation  of dominant strategy incentives, 
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•  there  is  a  strong  negative  relationship  between  the  marginal  rate  of 
substitution  and the rate of contribution; and 
•  contribution rates fall with re.'~etition  and with experience (where repeti- 
tion  represents  a  sequence  of  decisions  within  the  same  group,  and 
experience  represents  another  similar  sequence  of  decisions  with  a 
different groupL 
And,  with  regard  to  learning  and  reputation  effects,  Andreoni  (1988) 
finds that: 
•  subjects  in  repeated encounters contribute  less to  the  public  good than 
subjects in one-time encounters; 
•  the  proportion  of  free  riders,  or  subjects  that  consistently  use  the 
dominant  strategy  decision,  is  greater  in  repeated  encounters  than  in 
one-time encounters; and 
•  experience effects are greater for subjects in one-time encounters than for 
subjects in repeated encounters. 
A  number of papers (Ledyard, 1993,  and references therein) have tried to 
attribute  the  contributions  to  altruism  on  the  part  of  the  subjects.  It  is 
argued  that  the  experimentally induced  monetary incentives do  not  fully 
control  for  all  aspects  of  a  subject's  utility,  and  that  utility  may  partly 
depend  on  the  welfare  or  efficiency  of  the  group  outcome  as  well  as 
monetary payoff. If the amount of consideration given to the group outcome 
is  high  enough,  contribution  to  the  public  good  is  consistent  with  utility 
maximization. 
However.  the  presence  of  altruism  does  little  to  explain  the  counter- 
intuitive results in Andreoni (1988).  After all, with the additional assump- 
tion of incomplete information, the ability to establish reputations is known, 
at least theoretically, to justify the use of dominated strategies; see Kreps et 
al.  (1982).  The  woik  of  Kreps  et  al.  suggests  that,  if  anything,  the 
contribution rates in repeated encounters shoulo be higher, not lower, than 
the contribution rates in one-time encounters. 
In addition to the systematic qualitative features of the data noted above, 
there is also much statistical variation across trials. This suggests yet another 
explanation,  which  is  simply  that  the  data  are  noisy.  6  Because  of  the 
experimental  designs  that  are  used,  'noise"  (in  the  sense  of  statistical 
deviation  from  the  theoretical  prediction)  can  only  manifest  itself  as 
contribution. None of the past studies is designed to collect data that enable 
accurate  measurement of the  separate  effects of "noise'  and  ~altruism"  on 
voluntary contributions. 
Recently, Andreoni (1992) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1992) have designed 
experiments that  enable differentiation.  Andreoni proceeds by comparing 
"One can imagine many reasons why the data might be noisy: incomplete  subject under- 
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data  collected  from  a  standard  environment  with  data  collected  from  a 
similar  environment  in  which  group  efficiency was no  longer  important  to 
the  individual.  Andreoni  attributes  actions  which  help  the  group  in  the 
manipulated  environment  to  "confusion',  and  he  attributes  the  additional 
contribution  in  the  standard  environment  to altruism. 
Building on Palfrey and  Prisbrey (1992) we use a  heterogeneous environ- 
ment in which each  individual's  marginal  rate  of substitution  is varied over 
the course of an experiment.  By obser¢ing a subject's decisions at a number 
of different  marginal  rates  of substitution,  instead  of at  just  one,  and  by 
assuming  that  subjects  make  errors  at  some  non-negative  rate  (possibly 
zero),  the  subject's  entire  response  functior-  can  be  estimated.  Using  the 
separat.e  techniques  of probit  and  clas~i.:ication  analysis,  they  are  able  to 
directly measure  the rate  of errors  in  the subject pool, and  also to directly 
measure  contributions due t,,  altruism. 
The  research  presented  here  re-examines  the  surprising  partners-stran- 
gers  findings  of  Andreoni  (1988)  in  the  heterogeneous  environment  of 
Palfrey and Prisbrey (1992), and proposes an explanation consistent ~vith his 
findings  and  findings  in  past  experiments.  This  new  explanation  combines 
the  'uncontrolled  incentives'  rationalization  with  a  statistical  model  of 
subject decision errors.  The  design  permits  a  separation  of the  three  basic 
effects  that  have  '.,~n  hypothesized  to  explain  voluntary  contribution  in 
experiments,  name~  altruism,  reputation-building,  and  noise,  it also allows 
direct  measurement  of experien~,e  effects. 
3.  The independent private  values environment 
We consider ~- group  of N  individuals,  each  with  X,,  a  divisible endow- 
ment  of a  private  good,  and  a  value  for  increments  of the  private  good. 
Each individual  must choose an amount of his/her endowment to keep and 
an  amount  to give to the  public good. The  utility of the  individual  is 
U(y,  x i ) =  Vy +  r,x  i  , 
where V  is the value of the public good, y  is the amount of the public good 
produced  by  the  entire  group,  r i  is  the  individual's  value  for  the  private 
good, and x,  is the  amount  of the  endowment  that  is kept for private  use. 
The technology is such that,  for every unit of the private good contributed, 
one unit  of the  public good is produced. 
By  varying  an  individual's  r,  over  a  number  of  decision  periods,  it  is 
possible to estimate  that  individual's  decision  rule,  D,(ri/V  ).  where ri/V  is 
the  individual's  marginal  rate  of substitution.  Theoretically,  an  individual's 
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0.  if ri/V <  1 + a, + e,, 
D,(r,/V)=  X,.  otherwise, 
where  a i  is  individual i's  level  of altruism,  and  e i  is a  random  error  term. 
This type of decision rule is called a cut-point rule and the value c, =  1 + a, is 
called the cut-point. Without the error term e,  and as ioilg as the game does 
not  have  an  infinite  number  of  decision  periods,  the  above  rule  is  the 
complete-information, dominant-strategy decision rule. The inclusion of the 
error  term  accounts  for  the  possibility of random  errors  or  unpredictable 
behavior by subjects. 
Depending on the assumptions made about the distributions of a, and e,. 
it  is  possible  to  estimate  the  decisior,  rules  in  a  variety of ways.  Possible 
assumptions about a, are:  (i) all individuals have the same level of altruism 
and therefole the same a,: (ii) a, is never negative: or (iii) q,  is drawn from 
some distribution. There are also many ways in which e, can be distributed. 
some that assume that all types of errors are equally likely, and others that 
assume that drastic errors  are  less likely. 
We offer two methods for estimating the decision functions. The first is to 
use  an  ordered  probit  analysis.  The  ordered  probit  analysis  implicitly 
assumes  that  all  subjects  use  the  same  decision  rule  and  that  the  e,'s  are 
distributed  in  a  Normal  distribution with mean zero.  The  assumption  of a 
Normal  distribution  makes drastic  errors  (contributing  when  r,/V  is  much 
larger than c,). less likely than small errors (contributing when r,/V  is close 
to  c,).  The  second  method  is  non-parametric  and  is  called  a  classification 
errors  analysis. This method is used to estimate individual decision rules. 
4.  Experimental design 
All experiments were run using computers in the experimental economics 
laboratory at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra. We conducted four experimen- 
tal  sessions,  with each  session  consisting of a  sequence  of four  parameter 
treatments.  There  were  12  first-year,  undergraduate,  economics  students 
who participated  in each session,  making a  total of 48 different subjects. 
At  the  beginning  of each  session  each  subject  was  seated  in  front  of a 
computer terminal. All terminals were in the same room and were physically 
isolated  from  each  other  with  partitions.  Subjects  were  paid  in  points  (1 
point = 0. l  Spanish pta.).  At the end of a  sessio.*l each subject was paid in 
private  the  total  amount  he/she  had  earned  during  the  session.  Average 
earnings per  subject  for the  sessions  equalled  1266  ptas.  and  each  session 
lasted a  little more  than an  hour. 
Each of the four parameter treatments within a session were conducted as 
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the  following  information.  Each  treatment  involved  a  sequence  of  10 
decision periods.  In each period every subject was endowed with 9 tokens, 
each  of  which  they  could  either  keep  or  spend,  and  each  subject  was 
privately  assigned  a  token  value  (r  i,  in  our  notation)  which  specified  how 
much each kept token would be worth to that subject in that period. A  new 
token value was drawn for each subject in each period, independently, from 
a  uniform  distribution  between  1  and  20  points,  in  1  point  increments. 
Subjects were not told the other subjects' exact token values. 
In each period subjects were assigned  into groups of four.  In addition to 
the  value  of  his/her  kept  tokens,  every  member  of  a  group  earned  an 
amount (V, in our notation) for each token that was spent by any member of 
the group. This amount,  V, was the same for all members of the group and 
was fixed for the entire  10 periods of a parameter treatment.  In the first two 
parameter  treatments  of each session V was 6 points,  a'ad in the last two of 
each session V was l0 points.  The above information  agout the distribution 
of token  values and  how earnings  were determined  wits explained  in  great 
detail,  using  a  table  displayed  on  the  board  in  front  9f the  room  and  by 
working through  examples. Subjects were then promptt d for questions they 
had about the rules according to which the earnings were determined.  Two 
practice rounds were conducted, in which subjects were instructed to spend 
a  number  of  tokens  equal  to  the  last  digit  of  their  subject  ID  number. 
During  the  practice  rounds  the  experimenter  carefully  went  over  the 
keyboard instructions and the screen display for the subjects. At the start of 
each period the screen displayed for each subject V, r i. and also displayed a 
payoff table. At the end of the period, after everyone in the room had made 
their  spending  decisions,  subjects were  told  how  much  each  of the  other 
members of their group had spent, and the correct entry in the payoff table 
was highlighted.  The subjects also could access a history screen which kept a 
record  of  all  information  they  had  received  in  earlier  periods  of  that 
experiment.  After the  practice  rounds  a  quiz  was given  to  the  subjects to 
verify that they understood the basic rules of the experiments, including how 
token values were assigned and how earnings were computed. A  translation 
(from  Spanish)  of  the  instructions  and  procedures  can  be  found  in  the 
appendix of Palfrey and  Prisbrey (1993). 
In  two  of  the  sessions,  which,  following  Andreoni  (1988)  we  call 
Strangers,  the  subjects  were  randomly  assigned  new  groups  after  each 
decision period.  The  random  assignment  process was used  to approximate 
one-time  encounters.  In  the  other  two  sessions,  named  Partners,  the 
subjects  were  assigned  to  new  groups  only  between  each  of  the  four 
10-period  parameter  treatments;  i.e.  during  a  particular  10-period  treat- 
meat,  subjects were  repeatedly  assigned  to  the  same  group.  The  subjects 
were  told  at  the  beginning  of the  session  whether  their  groups  would  be 
randomly changed  between periods or if groupings would remain  the same 
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This design enables us to examine experience effects, in  addition to the 
effects of partnership.  Decisions  in  the  first  and  third  treatments of each 
session are coded as inexperienced decisions. The rationale for this division 
is that in the first and third treatments, the subjects see a particular V for the 
first time. In the second and fourth treatments of each session the subjects 
see a public good value for the second consecutive time, and these decisions 
are coded as experienced. No subject participated in more than one session, 
5.  Analysis of the data 
The  data  analysis centers on the  measurement of subject decision rules 
and is specifically organized around the measurement of cut-point rules  and 
error rates. 
5.1.  Aggregate data -a  simple classification  analysis 
As a first cut, we estimate a common cut-point, c, and common error rate, 
e,  which  best  describe  the  aggregate  data.  The  analysis  proceeds  by 
determining the  rate  of classification  errors  in  the  data  for each possible 
cut-point. For each token and for each subject, the subject's decision (spend 
or  keep  the  token)  is  classified  as  an  error,  if,  under  the  hypothetical 
cut-point  rule,  the  subject  should  have  contributed  the  token  (i.e.  the 
subject  had  a  value  ri/V  which  was  strictly  less  than  the  hypothetical 
cut-point),  but  the subject did  not  contribute  the  token,  or  if,  under the 
hypothetical cut-point, the subject should not have contributed the token, 
but  did  contribute  the  token.  Since  each  subject  is  endowed  with  nine 
tokens in each period, for every hypothetical cut-point the number of errors 
we  measure  for  any  given  subject  in  any  given  round  can  be  any  non- 
negative integer less than  10.  The estimated common cut-point, c*, is  the 
hypothetical cut-point with the fewest classification errors, and the estimated 
common error rate,  e*,  equals the rate of classification errors if c*  is the 
cutpoint. 
Fig.  1  shows  the  number  of classification  errors  as  a  function  of  the 
hypothetical cut-point, and illustrates the effects of reputation. For both the 
Partners  and  the  Strangers  treatment,  the  theoretical  cut-point  with  the 
lowest rate of classification errors is c* =  1, which is consistent with the joint 
hypotheses of (a) homogeneity of subject decision rules and (b) no altruism 
in the subject pool. 
We  next  consider the  hypothesis  suggested  by  the  reputationai  model. 
namely that  subjects  in  one-time  encounters have  a  lower cut-point  than 
subjects in  repeated encounters. Fig.  1 shows that  the c*  in  the Strangers 418  T.R.  Palfrey. J.E.  Prisbrey  /  Journal of Public Economics  61 (1996) 4119-427 
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Partners. 
condition is equal to the c* in  the Partners condition,  so using this method 
of decision rule  estimation,  there  is no evidence of a  reputation  effect. 
However, the  data  show support  for an  alternative  'noise"  hypothesis to 
account for the differences between the Strangers and Partners data: as seen 
in  Fig.  1,  subjects  in  one-time  encounters  have  a  higher  error  rate  than 
subjects in repeated encounters.  Experience reduces error rates in much the 
same way as partnership  (Palfrey and  Prisbrey,  1993,  fig.  2). 
The  graphical  presentation  is  further  reinforced  by  a  least  squares 
regression  with  the  average  group  error  rate  per  round,  assuming  that  all 
subjects  use  a  cut-point  of  1  as  the  dependent  variable.  The  regression 
contains  four independent  variables:  a  constant:  PART, which  is  1 for the 
Partners data and 0 for the Strangers data: EXPER, which is 1 for data from 
experienced  subjects and  0  otherwise:  and  PER,  which  runs  from  1 to  10 
and is the number of the period. The  results of the regression are shown in 
Table  1. 
The  variable  PART  is  negative  and  significant,  reflecting  the  lower 
average  error  rates  in  repeated  encounters.  The  variable  EXPER  is  also 
negative and significant,  reflecting the lower error rates in experiments with 
experienced subjects. The  regression  also shows that  error  rates fall over a 
10-round  session  since  the  coefficient  on  PER  is  negative  and~  for  a 
one-tailed  test. significant. T,R.  Pal[rey. J.E.  Prisbrey  /  Journal of Public  Economics  61 (1996) 409-427  419 
Table 1 
A least squares regression with the average error rate per round as the dependent  variable 
Independent  Estimated  t-statistic 
variable  coefficient 
Constant  0.241  15.24 
PA  RT  - 0.035  - 2.89 
EXPER  -0.032  -2.68 
PER  - 0.(~14  -  1.89 
No. of obs.  160 
R-"  0.11 
/~ -"  0.09 
5.2.  Aggregate  data -  an  ordered probit  analysis 
An  alternative  approach  to  measuring  an  "average decision  rule"  among 
the subjects is ordered probit analysis (McKelvey and Zavonia,  1975). The 
ordered probit  analysis  estimates  the  probability of any  number of tokens 
being  contributed  as  a  function  of  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution.  An 
advantage  of this  approach  is  that  it  is  easy  to  measure  the  independent 
effects of reputation, experience and period using dummy variables, and to 
summarize  these effects in a  concise way (see Table 2). 
The dependent variable in the analysis is the subject's decision, a  number 
from  0  to  9.  The  independent  variables  are:  a  constant;  r/V;  PART  and 
PARTS  which  are,  respectively,  constant  and  slope 7  dummies  for  the 
partners treatment; EXPER  and EXPERS  which are, respectively, constant 
and  slope  dummies  for experience effects; and  LATE  and  LA TES  which 
are,  respectively,  constant  and  slope  dummies  for  decay  effects  8  over  a 
10-period session. 
We calculate a  probit response curve equal to the predicted percentage of 
tokens  contributed  as  a  function  of r/V  and  in  Fig.  2  plot  this  curve  for 
several of the treatments. To do this we compute a  'score" for each value of 
r/V. which determines the location of the mean of a Normal density function 
on a  line divided into inter-als by the probit-generated threshold values.  In 
the  present  situation  there are  nine  intervals,  one  interval  for each  of the 
possible  decisions,  0-9.  The  area  below  the  density  and  between  the 
thresholds n  and n  -  1 is equivalent to the estimated probability that event n 
occurs. A  curve that gives the expected contribution as a function of r~ V can 
then  be generated.  For comparison we  also display in  Fig.  3  the aggregate 
empirical contribution frequencies as a  function of r/V. 
r Slope dummies are the product of the dummy variable and r/V. 
Recall that past experiments have observed that contribution rates decay over a llbperiod 
session. The dummy variable LATE is I) in rounds  1-5 and  I in rounds 6-10. 420  T.R.  Palfrey..I.E.  Prisbrey  /  Journal of Public Economics  61 (19961 409-427 
Table 2 
Ordered  probit  analysis. The  dependent variable is the  number of tokens contributed. The 
log-likelihood and s;,mple size are also given 
Independent  Estimated  Asymptotic 
variable  coefficient  t-statistic 
1  1.57  16.27 
r/V  -I}.66  -  I 1  .(H) 
PARTS  -11.18  -2.81 
PART  0.17  1.73 
EXPERS  -0.15  -2.37 
EXPER  11.15  1.48 
LATES  -0.18  -2.86 
LATE  I).18  1.76 
A,  11.29  19.61 
A.  0.55  38.17 
A~  0.77  59.52 
A+  0.93  75.23 
A,  1  .(D  98.05 
A.  1.19  1(15.62 
A-  1.35  95.63 
A~  1.57  74. I 1 
Log-likelihood  - 3303.2 
N  19211 
l  0 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3 
Fig.  2.  The  expected  contribution as a  function of  r/V as estimated  by  the  ordered  probit 
model. T.R.  Palfrey. J.E.  Prisbrey  /  Journal of Puhfic Economic.s  61  (Iq~) 409-427  42! 
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Fig. 3.  Em0irical contribution rates, aggregated o~'er all treatments  and sessions. 
If  subjects  behaved  in  a  way  that  is  perfectly  consistent  with  Nash 
equilibrium and made no errors, the response function would be graphed as 
a  step  function  which  dropped  from  9  to  0  at  r/V=  I.  if  the  subjects" 
decision rules are prone to errors, the estimated curve in Fig. 2 would not be 
a  ~ep  function,  but  would  be  S-shaped.  ~ The  more  errors  that  are  made 
relative to the  average cut-point,  the  flatter the  curve would  become.  The 
estimated cut-point based on the probit analysis is equal to the value of r/V 
at which the predicted contribution is half of the endowment, or 4.5 tokens. 
Fig.  2  shows  the  close  proximity  of  the  estimated  cut-points  for  the 
various  treatments  (inexperienced vs.  experienced  and  Partners  vs.  Stran- 
gers).  All four estimated cut-points are very close (within 0.05)  to one. The 
only  difference  between  the  curves  is  in  their  slopes.  The  steepest  curve 
comes  from  the  Partners  with  experience  treatment,  the  next  from  the 
Partners with  no experience, the  next from the  Strangers  with  experience, 
and  the  flattest curve is  from the  Strangers  with  no experience treatment. 
These observations are consistent with the  results of the  previous section. 
The fact that PARTS  is significant indicates that there is more noise in the 
one-shot treatments  than  in  repeated encounters.  The subjects  in one-time 
encounters  have  flatter expected contribution  curves and  therefore have  a 
higher  error  rate. ~"  The  variable  EXPERS  is  significant,  supporting  the 
hypothesis that experience reduces noise: inexperienced subjects have flatter 
response  curves than experienced subjects.  The coefficients on  LATE  and 
" Heterogeneity of subject decision ru!es can also bca source of flattening of the response 
curves. The explicit measurement of heterogeneity of cut-points and error rates is conducted in 
the next subsection. 
*" This could be due either to more  individual error, more variance ucross subjects, or a 
combination of both. See Subsection 5.3. ")'9  4_,  T.R.  Palfrey. J.E.  Prisbrey  /  Journal of Public Economics 61 (1996)  409-427 
LATES  mirror  these  results,  indicating  that  the  effect  of  the  10-period 
repetition is similar to experience effects. The response curves are steeper in 
the  last  half of a  10-period  session  than  in  the  first  half,  but  the  average 
contribution  rate  is  unchanged. ~  At  first  glance  this  would  seem  to 
contradict  past  findings  of  significant  decay.  But  in  fact  there  is  no 
contradiction  at  all.  It  simply  means  that  the  observed  decay  in  past 
experiments was due  to learning,  not  reputation,  t2 
This  lack  of reputation  effects is  further documented  in  Table  3,  where 
the effect of PART  and  LATE  on  average contributions is cross-tabulated. 
Reputation effects would predict more decay in the Partners treatment than 
in  the  Strangers  treatment.  In  fact, the  opposite  is observed  (although  the 
difference is not statistically  significant at the  5%  "evel). 
5.3.  Individual  data  -  classification  analysis 
The  probit  analysis  reported  above  is  carried  out  under  a  maintained 
hypothesis  of homogeneity of subject  decision  rules.  While  that  approach 
has the virtue of providing a  concise summary of the  aggregate features of 
the data, we cannot use that approach to identify the relative contribution of 
hetereogenity  and subject error to the flatness of the response curves (i.e. the 
"noise" in the data). To identify those two sources of noise, it is necessary to 
analyze the data at the individual level and explicitly allow for heterogeneity 
of decision  rules across subjects. 
In this subsection we apply the simple classification analysis of Subsection 
5.1  at  the  individual  level.  By  doing  so  we  are  able  to  estimate  a 
distribution ~3  of  cut-points  across  the  entire  subject  pool.  From  these 
Table 3 
Mean contribution  (out of 9 tokens) as a function of LATE and PART.  N = 4811 in each cell 
Partners  Strangers 
Earl}'  3.39  3.78 
(t= 1-5) 
Late  3.53  3.64  (t = 6 -  11)) 
~t The average contribution rate in periods 1-5 is 3.583 and the average contribution rate in 
periods 6-111 is 3.585. 
t_, If we censor a44 our observations with MRS < 4. then indeed we also measure significant 
decay that is large in magnitude. 
~ Rapoport  ',1987) has  argued  that  heterogeneity  may be  an  important  ingredient  of a 
complete explanation for behavior in other (step-level) public goods environments. Isaac et al. 
(1984). Ledyard (1993). and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994) make similar points. T.R. Palfrey..I.E.  Prisbrey I Journal of Public Economics 61 (1996) 4~19-427  423 
estimated  cut-points  we can compute  error rates  for each  individual  as the 
percentage  of  decisions  that  violate  their  estimated  cut-point  rule.  The 
distributions  of  error  rates  and  the  distribution  of  cut-points  are  then 
compared across treatments. 
5.3.1.  The distribution  of individual cut-points 
Fig.  4  shows the  distribution  of estimated  individual  cut-points across the 
192 observations.  14 The distribution t5  is centered  at 0  (i.e.  Nash cut-points) 
and  is  nearly  symmetric.  The  median  cut-point  is  0  and  accounts  for 
approximately  30%  of  the  observations.  Two-thirds  of  the  observations 
range from -3  to +3, with the remaining one-third evenly divided below -3 
and  above  +3.  Three-quarters  of the  observations  range  from  -4  to  +4, 
again with  the  remainder  being evenly divided  between  large  negative and 
large positive cut-points.  Consistent with the probit analysis, we find that on 
average  subjects are  neither  altruistic  nor spiteful.  By this we do not mean 
that  we  find  no subject  behaving altruistically.  There  are,  in  roughly equal 
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Cutpoint  (deviation  from  Nash) 
Fig.  4.  Classification of error minimizing cut-points.  UPF data for series  1. 
~ For each of our 48 subjects  we report four separate "observations" corresponding  to the 
four  treatments that  a  subject  participated  in:  low-V- inexperienced;  low-V- experienced; 
high-V - inexperienced:  and high-V - experienced. 
L~ Deviations  from Nash  cut-points  are  measured  in  token  value  units.  A  cutpoint  of 0 
corresponds  to  MRS = I  in  earlier  figures. In  a  few  of  the  observations  more  than  one 
hypothetical  cut-point  minimized classification errors.  Such ties were broken by choosing the 
one closest to 0. 424  T.R.  Palfrey.  J.E.  Prisbrey  /  Journal of Pubfic Economics 61  (1996) 409-427 
numbers,  both  altruists  (subjects  with  positive  cut-points)  and  spiteful 
subjects  (with  negative  cut-points)  in  this  subject  pool.  However,  to  the 
extent that  we observe these deviations from 0 cut-points,  those deviations 
are typically small  in  magnitude. 
If we break down the distribution of cut-points by the Partners/Strangers 
treatment,  we find a  systematic effect, but not what we would expect from 
the  hypothesis  that  repeated  groups  have  'reputation  effects'  that  lead  to 
more contribution.  The  reputation hypothesis predicts that  repeated groups 
will  have  cut-points  that  are  typically  higher  than  the  cut-points  in  the 
one-shot treatment.  We do not find this. The average or median cut-point in 
both  treatments  equals  0.  The  difference  between  the  two distributions  is 
that the distribution for Strangers is more dispersed than the distribution  for 
Partners.  This  is illustrated  in  Fig.  5,  which displays the  empirical  cumula- 
tive frequencies separately for the  Strangers  data and  the  Partners  data. 
5.3.2.  Tt,  e  distribution  of classification  errors 
From the above classification analysis we can also obtain estimates for the 
distribution  of  classification  errors  across  individuals.  The  error  rate  we 
compute  is the  fraction  of an  individual's  decisions (within  one treatment) 
that are misclassified according to that individual's estimated cut-point.  Over 
20%  of the  time  subjects can  be  perfectly classified;  60%  of the  time  we 
measure  error  rates  below  10%;  and  25%  of the  error  rates  fall  between 
10% and 20%.  Fig. 6 shows the effect of experience on error rates. There is 
a  leftward shift  in  the  error  rate  distribution,  indicating  fewer errors  with 
experience.  Error  rates  are  also  systematically  lower  in  the  Partners 
treatment  than  in  the  Strangers  treatment  (see  Palfrey and  Prisbrey,  1993, 
fig.  8). 
Cumulative Frequency  (%} 




Deviation from Nash (Token value units) 
Fig. 5.  Individual cut-points. UPF data. Partners vs. Strangers. Key: --*--. Partners; --U}--. 
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Error  rate 
Fig. 6.  Fraction  of decisions misclassified  relative Io estimated cut-point (cumulative  frequency 
distribution). Key: ........  . experienced (N = 96); ~.  inexperienced (N = 96). 
6.  Conclusions 
The  results  in  this  paper  point  to  a  new  interpretation  of  observed 
violations  of  dominant  strategies  to  free  ride  in  voluntary  contributions 
experiments. The explanation we suggest is not that subjects are on average 
either  particularly  altruistic  or  particularly  spiteful.  Consistent  with  An- 
dreoni  (1988)  we  find  no  evidence  of  reputational  effects  of  the  sort 
proposed in  Kreps and Wilson (1982)  and others.  Rather, subjects exhibit 
statistical  fluctuations  in  their  decision-making,  manifested  as  random 
noise t6 in the data. This noise has both a  heterogeneity component and an 
individual subject error component. This explanation is consistent with our 
data, both at the aggregate level and at the individual level. 
How  does  such  an  explanation  account  for  the  apparently  altruistic 
behavior in  past  experiments where subjects  have  a  dominant strategy to 
free ride? The answer we propose is that in those experiments the design 
automatically censors  all  observations  of  subjects  who  have  a  dominant 
strategy to give, but end up free riding. In other words, in past experiments 
the only kind of observable  'error'  relative to Nash  theory was seemingly 
altruistic behavior.  If we re-examine our data censoring  all observations  of 
MRS <  1 (dominant strategy to give), then we  find aggregate contribution 
rates that are  statistically significant, and of a  magnitude comparable with 
t, Presumably these statistical fluctuations  are not purely random from the point of view of a 
subject making the decision. 426  T.R.  Palfrey.  J.E.  Prisbrey  /  Journal of Public Economics 61  (1996) 409-427 
what  has  been  found  in  these  other  studies.  Moreover,  as  in  Andreoni 
(1988)  we  find  more  contribution  in  the  Strangers  treatment  than  in  the 
Partners treatment. We are able to show that this difference is due to factors 
that  affect  the  variance  in  subjects'  decisions  and  decision  rules,  not  a 
systematic tendency of mean  behavior away from the  Nash  equilibrium.  A 
similar explanation  applies  to the  Saijo and  Nakamura  (1993) experiments 
where subjects have a  dominant strategy to give, but substantial  free riding 
is  observed.  The  observation  that  experience  reduces  violations  is  just  a 
reflection  that  experience  produces  lower  error  rates  and  lower  subject 
variation. 
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